

GERMANY'S RISE TO POWER

ROLE OF THE HOUSE OF KRUPP

IN GERMAN MILITARISM

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THESIS: The dominating role of the Krupp armament industry in all levels of German life in the twentieth century provided a leading cause for German entrance into two world wars. Restoration of power of the Krupp industries since the war's end symbolizes the resurrection of Germany as a force potent in world affairs. Will this Kruppian reign return Germany to militarism?

"Militarism is a form of civilization and a state of mind. It presses for stronger armaments and accustoms the ordinary citizens to the idea that weapons alone can settle a strife of peoples." Adherents to this philosophy are found in German military policy and administration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The creed of militarism includes five articles: privilege is an advantage(imperialism); might makes right(materialism); war is desirable; war is inevitable(fatalism); states are natural enemies(nationalism)<sup>1</sup>. This creed of militarism was accepted by three important leaders of German civilization: Industry, Government, and the Army Chiefs of Staff.

Industry is represented by the House of Krupp. In 1587 the first Krupp appeared and became the richest citizen of Essen as an iron merchant. Since then the House of Krupp has played a significant role in making or destroying German political leaders. In 1811 Fredrich Krupp(1787-1826) opened a workshop for casting steel and thus helped the Prussians defeat Napoleon. From 1859-70 Alfred Krupp(1812-87) aided Bismarck against Austria, Russia and France. The saga of the Krupps

is one of intrigue and lust for power. It is a story of an economic empire which survived depressions, military defeats and foreign occupation. It is a tale of materialistic, unscrupulous but able men, who engaged in selling weapons to all nations and who helped exacerbate one diplomatic crisis after another.

Part I delves into the manipulations of the House of Krupp in starting a vicious, competitive armament trade to enemy nations before World War I. Norbert Muhlen concentrates on how the Krupps promoted naval armaments for Germany, then sold these arms abroad. Bernhard Menne demonstrates how Krupp ambassadors had a "hot line" on all diplomatic developments in arms trade through key government personnel. A second area for discussion is Imperial Government, or the means used by Wilhelm II to secure favorable domestic and foreign contracts for Krupp. Arthur Rosenberg, as a reporter for the Reichstag Commission of 1931, saw in the Kaiser's decisions an attempt to enhance his role of a ruler who is above all power; whose show of might was right. This Treitschke principle, Karl Nowark emphasizes, was utilized by Wilhelm in Moroccan and Balkan crises, in his support of Krupp arms trade. In a third sphere the Army Chiefs of Staff promoted the desirability and inevitability of war. Gerhard Ritter researched the Schlieffen papers to produce an analysis of this general's nationalistic motives for German militarism. Walter Goelitz, a German historian, considered Waldersee's theories and the younger von Moltke's passive role amidst the rising tide of militarism. The parts played by

these three sectors in German militarism caused increased tensions in European affairs and subsequent reasons for the First World War.

Part II enumerates the role of the House of Krupp in correlating the creed of militarism and World War II. Peter Batty and Norbert Muhlen describe the imperialistic ends (article I of the creed) of Krupp rearmament between the wars. Walter Goelitz enumerates situations in which the Chiefs of Staff become involved in the testing procedures for nationalistic motives. The authors discuss Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach(1870-1950) in his support of Hitler for politico-economic reasons. Leslie Simon who expresses the inner rationale of the people and Krupp's response to Hitler's cries: might makes right, war is desirable, war is inevitable, states are natural enemies. The destruction of Krupp and Allied help in rebuilding is shown by Muhlen to be an attempt to eliminate the creed of militarism. Berthold Beitz's reconstruction of the House in the 1950's seemed to keynote the end to an era.

In Part III this student of history analyzes the situation pro and con: will Germany under the House of Krupp economic impact resurrect the creed of militarism?

## Part I Making the World Open its Eyes

The new Kaiser of 1888, Wilhem II, promoted Germany in foreign affairs by placing government contracts with ~~her~~ <sup>2</sup> leading armorer and industry, the House of Krupp. With government loans Fritz Krupp (1854-1902) was able to expand his plant area. By corporation brigandage and stock exchange piracy ~~he~~ bought up coal mines in Germany, the French Lorraine, Luxembourg and iron ore fields in Spain and Sweden. He acquired the rival <sup>German</sup> Gruson arms factory by secretly buying shares until 1892. Not only did he secure favorable sources of raw materials, but Krupp secured patents for the newest methods of arms production. Through well placed contacts, he had advance knowledge of the Bessemer process. This put Krupp on a steel production level equal to England. He bought the license for gunpowder from Alfred Nobel and became the first firm on the continent in the production of ammunition. By 1893 Krupp held the patent for nickel steel alloy and established the first armor plate mill on the continent.

These accomplishments were but a beginning. "It was not in the interests of the firm to perfect an armor which would make shells useless". <sup>3</sup> Therefore the Krupp spent the next 20 years researching new missiles to pierce the armor. And with each of these development came huge orders. Despite the protests of Reichstag leaders Krupp complained, "We can not live from Prussia alone; when foreign states place orders, I can not supply bad stuff to them." As a result the Essen concern

soon became a barometer indicating the pressures of the international arms race. / "Scruples never troubled the Krupps," says Mühlen, as they sold 24,000 guns to Germany before World War I and 26,000 to 50 other nations.<sup>4</sup> So went the artillery trade.

In the meantime Bismarck was dismissed (1891) and Wilhelm II no longer met with ministerial objection to his campaign for Germany's future on the seas. One of his friends, Fritz Krupp, had been financing the Navy League since 1898 to promote the Kaiser's interest in naval armament. The League's monthly publication told the educated middle class about future German supremacy; and told the working class of increased employment from the proposed shipyards. The Navy League was a hit securing a membership of a million. It was divided into 5000 local branches and included prominent government ministers. As a result of the extensive base the Reichstag passed three Navy Acts (1898, 1900, 1906).<sup>5</sup> *of support*

In 1902 Krupp had secretly acquired the Germania shipyards at Kiel, after buying up shares through undercover agents). When the Kaiser was ready to designate a firm to build an extensive German fleet, the House was ready under its new leaders, Bertha Krupp (1886-1957) and her husband Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach Krupp (1870-1950) took over when Fritz died in 1902. They built the first German submarine in 1906 and produced none up to 1914. The firm also produced the decisive weapons of the pre-war race, dread-

noughts. They were battleships with ten 12" guns and 24 quickfire guns to match the British.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, the Krupps became the only private German shipyard to build every future class - battleships, cruisers, destroyers, subs. All this activity in the Navy Era was promoted by Krupp and his friend Admiral Tirpitz. This led to increased in not only German demands but foreign orders as well. After gropping among mountains of papers, Bernhard Menne found that Krupp offered his armor plate to the ship builders of Britain and France. The profits the firm accrued from this new area of trade are discernible in the figures of Krupp's personal fortune which amounted<sup>4</sup> to 200 million marks after 1900. At the same time the Krupp firm became Europe's largest industrial combine with a total property value of 300 million marks and with annual profits of well over 25 million marks.<sup>7</sup>

Krupp played an important role in trade<sup>which</sup> led to leadership in policy making. According to the 1871 Constitution final decisions in all such political matters rested in the hands of the Emperor. In domestic affairs the Imperial Cabinet was responsible to the Emperor as was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. But Wilhelm I, quips Professor Rosenberg of Berlin, was far from a Bismarckian statesman who could "juggle countries' interests abroad".<sup>8</sup> Firms with overseas investments pressurized the Emperor to provide protection and favors. Krupp with great amounts of surplus capital found backward parts of the globe easiest to place loans. Easy prey were

the Far East, North Africa and the Balkans with their natural resources, cheap labor, markets, corrupt and inefficient governments.<sup>9</sup> If German nationals or Krupp property were endangered, the dignity of the nation demanded defense of the rights of citizens. To ensure this support, Krupp retained imperial favor by equipping the navy and army which defended these interests.

Bernhard Menne notes the Imperial Government was now a pledged proponent of Krupp militarism in the Far East, Morocco and the Balkans. (For example, in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904, Krupp completed torpedo craft and subs despite Germany's declaration of neutrality. Britain protested.) Did the Kaiser take appropriate action? Within twenty-four hours after an outcry in the British press against the Krups, the Kaiser released the ships. The trusted Admiral Barandon, a former director of the Krupp firm, assured Wilhelm they were undoubtedly pleasure yachts, although they bore inscriptions like "torpedo room".<sup>10</sup> The Emperor was used effectively to attain militaristic goals while arousing the mistrust of England.

Krupp and the Kaiser next created a new arena of crisis. From 1906 the firm was engaged in the rearming of Russia, a process which was not completed until August, 1914.<sup>11</sup> Krupp's response to Russian roubles allowed every gun sold help that nation enclose Germany's Eastern Front.

Morocco is another trouble spot synonymous with Krupp.

Morocco was a valuable dumping ground for obsolete arms as well as an area with rich deposits of haematite ore necessary for production of ordnance steel. From 1904-5 the French firm Schneider sought a share in the market. France's Delcasse "offered Germany the port of Casablanca and financial support for the Bagdad Railway" for this share. Chief of Staff von Schlieffen opposed the attempt for economic markets. It was a clear sign France was down and it was time:

France should be provoked until she had no course but arms. If the French will not give way, let them come at us. They will run straight into our guns.

Wilhelm listened. With his well-advertised landing at Tunis he sacrificed German friendship with France to serve the militarism of an individual firm. It was at this point that France decided to abandon antagonism toward Britain and conclude an Entente against Germany. Later in 1911 another Moroccan crisis occurred in which Krupp forced the French competitors to their knees and secured a Moroccan contract for 145,000 tons of raw steel per year.<sup>12</sup>

Next one finds trouble spots in the Balkans. Germany did not renew the alliance with Russia, because of Krupp armament contracts in Turkey. Fortification of the Turkish frontier with Krupp turrets proved interfering to Russia's designs on the Straits. Krupp in the meantime sold the Turks obsolete arms at 165,000 marks, although the cost was 14,000<sup>13</sup> a piece.

In the 1912-3 Balkan wars, the firm was again on top. Krupp's supply of outdated arms left Turkey defeated. "Yet Krupp's participation in the Powder Trust made large quantities of German explosives available to nations opposed to Turkey- through Parisian centers." Thus the second act of the Balkan drama saw Krupp aiding Hungary, while his Austrian arms subsidiary, Skoda, was supplying Bulgaria and her opponents. "Confusion among various interests in the Balkans was Babelian in character" <sup>14</sup> These were the commercial machinations which set the stage for early twentieth century political struggles.

On the eve of war statistics of the Essen firm show 18 plants and 1000 ore mines in spots all over Germany. They used more electricity than the whole of Berlin; the length of railroad lines inside the works would have connected Frankfurt and Munich; their telegraph lines would have reached from Strassburg to Konigsberg. The industry had become an empire using its power to manipulate domestic and foreign ventures. Particularly in this second area Krupp attained world fame. He was director of the Harvey United Steel Company from 1901-12. The organization included:

German firms:	Krupp	47000	shares
	Dillingen	3700	shares
Austrian firms:	Skoda		
British firms :	Armstrong Vickers	2700	shares
	John Brown	7400	shares
French firms:	Schneider	9800	shares
American firms:	Bethlehem Steel	4300	shares

The policy of this War Trust or Arms Ring was to draw royalties

from all nations rather than cutthroat competition among each other. Their aim, as discussed in their publication, Arms and Explosives, was "to preserve universal peace by arming all nations with destructive weapons so that none would dare go to war". It became customary for any improvement in Krupp or-nance metal or design to be passed around to the other armament firms with customary royalties.<sup>15</sup> In a word, the Krupp firm became the pulse of international affairs.

The third sector of German civilization which allied with Krupp to promote militarism was the Prussian Army. This state within the State was commanded by the Kaiser through the Chiefs of Staff. Both Waldersee and von Schlieffen advocated war as desirable and inevitable, on the basis of Heinrich von Treitschke's declaration:

The moral majesty of war increases the virility and courage of a nation; it weaves a bond of love between her men.<sup>16</sup>

To them the nature of man makes war inevitable; states are natural enemies. Waldersee as Chief of Staff (1888-91) believed a Franco-German war was in the making and prepared an offensive against Russian invasion called "preventitive war". More important he convinced Wilhelm, contends Walter Goerlitz of "the necessity of readying military apparatus."<sup>17</sup> Von Schlieffen worked as Chief of Staff (1891-1905) creating a plan for encirclement. Gerhard Ritter comments:

The strategy was broad but shallow. He seems to have regarded the offensive against France as a geographical matter to be accomplished by a superior, armed German military machine<sup>18</sup>

Then why did the Chief of Staff fail to initiate armament reform? The French General Staff had introduced the 75 mm recoiling field gun, ballistically superior to anything the Germans produced. The French had military aviation units and the armored car. Berlin hesitated. When three experimental types of ~~arored~~ cars equipped with machine guns appeared at the 1908 Austro-German maneuvers, "nobody had the least idea what to do with them". Lt.Col. Burstyn of the Austrian rail troops offered the War Ministry in 1911, and arm-machine gun-carrying vehicle with caterpillar treads. "This prototype of the tank, writes Goerlitz, was not found worth <sup>19</sup> carrying beyond the experimental stage". The backstairs influence on these decisions was the Krupps. They did not own the patents nor did they see the value of purchasing the rights. Wilhelm II stood by the decision of his foremost armament manufacturer. Chief of Staff von Moltke (1905-14) had little to say in regards to weaponry. These questions were decided by War Minister Falkenhayn, who was strongly influenced by Krupp associates.

The complex maneuvers used by Krupp to achieve his control of government and army remains to be shown. By 1895 government departments and Krupp concerns were interlocking. Government officials were affiliated with the firm in various ways:

On the Krupp Company's (private limited liability firm) Board of Directors were the Minister of Railways, von Thielen and the Kaiser's naval expert, Admiral Barandon.

For instance the Admiral used his influence to have the Navy Bureau require would be contractors to provide artillery ranges for testing. This was beyond the resources of new or smaller firms and the House retained a virtual monopoly. Menne found in his research countless other examples:

The Minister of Labor, Budde, was a former director of a Krupp munitions work. Secretary of State's brother was employed by Krupp as was future Imperial Chancellor, Bulow. So was the son of the President of the Ordnance Board, who allotted arms contracts.

Hundreds of army people were simultaneously employed in Essen to oversee tests of ordnance. And the role of Krupp envoys abroad could fill several pages. He placed agents in German Embassies to secure innumerable tips on foreign arms purchased by diplomats. Finally, Krupp made personal friendships with men necessary instruments to his end. Among his frequent guest for dinner was noneother than a stockholder, Wilhelm II. 20

In 1900 the relationships and jobbery came out during the proceedings of the Budget Commission. For one of the few times in its career the Essen firm underwent a Parliamentary investigation. It was discovered that Krupp had profiteered in armor plate and wrung an annual sum of 3 million marks from the State. He was charging the State one million marks per battleship although the costs of production were far less. Admiral Tirpitz viewed Krupp's moves as betrayal of their friendship and supported the Left in the Reichstag to bring charges against the Krupp firm. But representatives were

powerless in face of a government dominated by the Emperor and his retinue. These men not parliament awarded the fat contracts and likewise controlled the purse strings. As the historian Hallgarten found after years of research in German State Records, "The entire government became Krupp agencies."

After the scandal died down Krupp continued his promotion of militarism. The Defence Association, a pan-German group proposing a huge army and a war of aggression, was supported by Krupp through newspaper advertisements. In 1909 the Union of Industrialists, whose President was a Krupp director, worked to inspire "patriotic" electors of the Reichstag. The firm financed a pseudo-scientific association under Krupp director Klumpf, which set up professors of nationalistic adour at the universities. Krupp acquired controlling interest of Wolff, the official telegraph bureau as a mouthpiece for Essen. He set up editorial offices of newspapers in thousands of towns abroad. The headquarters for this operation was the Intelligence Office. They collected information relating to armaments which appeared in foreign news. They made use of the agents to secure by bribery and espionage the latest drawings of ships and arms.

In the course of this discussion on German militarism the relations between industry, government and army were evident. Family friendship was used for ordnance contracts. Steel was then sold to the enemy irrespective of German nationalistic considerations. Business transactions and rivalries in arma-

ments became a cause and effect of one another. Granted the Krupps were but one of the European firms cavorting amidst the profits accrued during imperialistic ventures. Nevertheless, the Krupp's percentage of total arms trade demonstrates their important role in provoking competition. The difficulty in striking an equilibrium led to a heightened creed of militarism.

The Krupp's through their interlocking directorates among the navy, army, rail department, communications and transportation bureaus influenced the workings of the entire German State. The various plants also hired close to a 100,000 workers. But the foremost pocket of power, the Kaiser threw the balance to Krupp's favor. As a result he received a slice of every armament order prior to 1914. Had he manufactured the quality recoiling gun instead of immense quantities of heavy outdated artillery, Germany's treasury would have been put to good use. As it was the House of Krupp gobbled much of Germany's financial and natural wealth, involved the Kaiser and Chiefs of Staff in foreign policy crises, and aroused international tension. The creed of militarism which motivated the arms race led Germany down the road to ruin of World War I.

*Review Long Max*

## Part II Never to Rise Again?

According to the Versailles Treaty Germany was to have no defense forces, except an army of 100,000 and a token fleet of 15,000 sailors. Under Allied supervision workers of Krupp dismantled and destroyed 9000 machines, 800,000 tools and 22,000 cubic meters of masonry which had been used to produce weapons. Krupp was forced to produce tools of peace, <sup>such</sup> as movie projectors, textiles, cash registers, typewriters, motor scooters. Stainless steel which Krupp developed during the war was the only field in which he gained profit. <sup>22</sup> Even this would not have been possible without the help of outside forces. The German Government provided subsidies as restitution for damages suffered in the war, for weapon orders never paid for, for damages suffered during the Ruhr invasion. The Reich felt, "As Krupp goes so goes Germany". As a result, Chancellor Joseph Wirth voted Gustav in 1921, telling of "sums to be released to the firm to preserve German technology and lay new foundations for Germany's progress in weapons". The firm received <sup>23</sup> 15 million toward this end.

Krupp was also compensated by Britain for its wartime lease of patents on shell fuses to the Vickers arms trust. Since Britain had used hundreds of these fuses against German troops during the war, Krupp asked for 6 million. A secret arrangement was readied whereby "Krupp received his pay for the bullets which killed his countrymen". The United States helped by granting Krupp credits of 12 million in 1925 to help combat inflation. Boosted by these sums the House made

it through the 1920's when other firms crashed.<sup>24</sup>

For Krupp was investing these sums in items more profitable than tools of peace. Like most other Germans he considered one-sided the disarmament of <sup>his</sup> ~~their~~ country. It was not only an injustice but a danger to peace. For <sup>some</sup> states are natural enemies, said Krupp, and a defenseless Germany could easily invite aggression from neighbors. Therefore, the way to make the new Germany secure was through might-, arms production which at the same time would make a profit.

Gustav saw three loopholes in the Versailles Treaty: it did not prohibit Germany from blueprinting new weapons or constructing them on a draftboard; nor could the treaty forestall production of vehicles which could be easily transformed into tanks; it said nothing about German firms producing arms outside of the country. Gustav tells how he violated Versailles in an article "Plant Leaders and Armament Workers", which appeared in his firm's house magazine for 1 March 1942. As early as 1919 while the victors were squabbling, Gustav set up an information department in Essen and arranged for technological and military publications from all over the world to be sent there. In this way he kept abreast of the latest developments. In 1922 the Reichswehr signed a contract with Krupp to develop future German artillery on the draftboards.

Thus to the surprise of many, we began to manufacture products which appeared to be far distant from armaments. Even the Allied snooping commissions were duped. Padlocks, milk cans, cash registers, locomotives and automobiles made a "civilian" impression. 25

Krupp also took advantage of the third loophole. Armament achievements abroad are recorded in memoranda of the firm's business files. One pamphlet, "The Artillery Construction Department of Fried Krupp A.G. and the Development of Army Artillery from 1918 to 1933", goes into painstaking detail of <sup>armament</sup> operations in Sweden, Holland and Spain. *See the House of Krupp.*

Before the signature of Germany was on the Versailles Treaty, Krupp had made contracts to deliver guns to Holland and South American States. Thanks to connections with the Swedish Bofors firm he was able to make delivery. In 1918 he had bought his way into the Arms Factory by selling them his patents, blueprints and secret processes. Bofors and the silent Essen partner manufactured cannons as early as 1920. They included the 7.5 cm mountain gun which was tested in the Spanish Civil War by the German government. By 1925 Krupp owned 6 million of 19 million shares and had established a core of technicians who could readily be transferred to Essen. When the Swedish government saw fit to close down the establishment in 1935, ~~Krupp~~<sup>26</sup> had what he needed.

While Krupp developed army artillery in Sweden he was using two border countries for other purposes. In Switzerland his undercover firm tested an anti-aircraft gun. Holland also was easy prey. Here the most valuable work was completed because of the free flow of goods and personnel, and the compliance of Dutch businessmen. France tried as early as 1926 to ask the Dutch government to prohibit firms financial involvement with the Krupps. The projects, as revealed by documents

captured at Essen in 1945, show that Krupp was keeping not only the Allies in the dark, but the Germans as well. Service Publication No.15 Fight of the Navy against Versailles 1919-1935 shows, that in 1922 a dummy Dutch company, Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw, was established by Krupp. He moved his team of naval designers from Kiel to Rotterdam in order to "preserve and develop German U Boats". Models were then tested and sold to Japan, Turkey, and Finland.<sup>27</sup>

Spain and Japan also proved useful. Gustav bought back iron ore deposits at Bilbao and Cadiz. Here he began work on the new U boats that would be mass produced at Kiel after 1936. Admiral Canaris, who later achieved considerable fame was at that time negotiating construction of subs for the naval service. Japan was moving closer to a German axis with the secret Krupp treaty for making U boats.<sup>28</sup>

But the crowning victory was Krupp's dealings with Russia. In July 1922 after Rapallo, General von Seeckt, head of the German National Defence Force and Dr. Wirth, German Chancellor conducted a second military pact between the Red and German Army. Although it was given the bogus title, "Provisional Trade Agreement", its real intention was to involve German firms in redeveloping Russian and German arms. The German government provided unlimited funds to the German generals for the task by creating a cover organization called, "Society for the Encouragement of Commercial Enterprises". Under this guise poison gas and a wide range of artillery and ammunition

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were developed.

Meanwhile in Essen itself Krupp continued research and testing under the noses of Allied inspectors. In July, 1925, the firm opened a seemingly harmless machine factory in Berlin under the name Koch and Kienzle. For two years the firm designed and developed new howitzers, 8 types of cannons, a 21 cm mortar and a sprung gun carriage.<sup>30</sup>

*For* For in 1926 the creation of Pilsudski's military dictatorship and consequent strength of the Polish Army rendered the disquiet caused by the Polish Corridor more acute. Speaking under oath at Nuremberg, Generals von Blomberg and Blaskowitz, explained how officers were dominated by fear of a Polish invasion. The West was secured by Locarno but not the East. Therefore the General Staff had taken upon itself to enlist the immediate support of industry. They allotted a section the Economic Staff (Wirtschaftsstab), to the Weapons Department. The personnel on the staff came from various arms industries and their job was to organize raw material centers in spots hidden from the Control Commission. Thus the railway department of Krupps was secretly engaged in artillery production,<sup>31</sup> although they never changed their name outwardly.

By October, 1928 the German Army's (Reichswehr) Weapons Department asked Krupp to deliver two experimental "light tractors". This was the code name for tanks armed with machine guns, according to the prosecution at Alfred's Nuremberg Trial. These tanks, with the exception of the hydraulic safety switch,

were produced two years before the Reichswehr placed their order. By 1936 Krupp made an original contribution by welding rather than riveting the caterpillar treads, an innovation<sup>32</sup> reducing the weight of the vehicle. Thus, it was said that when Hitler came to power, Krupp had successfully bypassed Versailles.

In all these endeavors towards material ends Krupp found the ever present army <sup>was help (in)</sup>. When Krupp produced cannons in Sweden officers of the Reichswehr were present at the firing ranges. German naval officers sat in the Dutch Krupp office and others gained experience in Turkey, Finland, and Japan. Krupp had retained the ties he made in the era of the First World War.

But what Krupp lacked was support from the Democrats, pacifists and leftists who denounced the disarmament violations. On the other fence were men like Adolf Hitler who's permanent sounding package deals seemed appealing. The Interim State (Zwischenreich) provided anything but a strong government. And this was a prerequisite for the growth of Krupp whether there<sup>33</sup> was war or peace.

But Krupp did not immediately throw in his lot with Hitler. • The Krupps were German snobs looking at Hitler as a parvenu. Besides they always had been proud of their relation to the Old Guard Army, who were suspicious of the radicalism and • racialism of Hitler. Gustav's closest ties were with von • Seeckt and von Schleicher, who were decidedly aloof from the National Socialists. As late as the day before President von Hindenburg appointed Hitler as Chancellor, Krupp advised his old friend against the move. In the meantime neither Bruning

nor von Papen brought Germany into a responsible policy. By that time Hitler was eliminating possible rivals.

In January, 1932, Hitler was invited to the famous Industrie Club in Dusseldorf by the big Ruhr magnates. By November, 1932, Hjalmar Schacht, President of the Reichsbank, was pleading and scheming with these industrialists in behalf of Hitler. He drafted a letter to be signed by more than 200 German business leaders as an appeal to Hindenberg to appoint Hitler as his Chancellor. Gustav never attended the first meeting nor did he pen the petition. (A copy of the letter was later found in the safe of the I.H. Stein Bank in Cologne which showed Krupp's typewritten signature.) His aim had been to preserve the family business from possible Nazi failure.

But in January, 1933, Hitler was appointed Reich Chancellor. He surrounded himself with conservatives and right wingers. He then sought World War I flying ace, Goering, to invited 20 industrialists to hear a Hitler speech in February. As Hitler asked for financial aid for the coming general election, Gustav took notes. In Gustav's Private Correspondances 1933-4, the historian finds his impressions. Hitler had called for socialization of the big businesses excepting "the great pioneers of heavy industry, like Krupp". Their goals became complementary. While Gustav considered politics important only to give him a strong frame for business, Hitler regarded economics important as it gave stability to political affairs. Whereas the Weimar Republic was vacillating, Hitler was not in his aims to

restore German economic dominance. Thus the Krupp who had been proud of loyalty to the State transferred loyalty to the new Nazi state. Although he did not finance the Fuhrer's rise to power he certainly did nothing to prevent such a climb nor to help provide an alternative. He saw no danger in using the Nazis to the interests of Big Business.

After the speech Gustav pledged the Nazis \$150,000 towards the campaign fund. Once Hitler was in firm control there was "no holding of his ardour for the Nazi cause." Without consulting the other members of the Federation of German Industries he decreed in April, 1933, Jews would no longer remain in the Federation. He replaced the Jewish executive director with two Nazis. By August he issued the order introducing the Hitler salute in all German factories, not just his own. He became a super-Nazi sponsoring public meetings. Further he allowed 700 of his several thousand employees to be sent to concentration camps prior to September, 1939.

What other role did Krupp take besides financial contributions and political compliance? Files show that soon after his initial meeting with Hitler, Gustav openly shifted to tools of war. Orders came in from abroad. Once again as in pre World War I days arms were openly sold to South America, Turkey, Greece and Soviet Russia. Imperialistic ventures of militarism were seen in Korea and Japan, where the Krupps established plants using gasoline to produce steel (the revolutionary Renn Process). Then from 1933-5 his profits went up

from 6 to 12 million. By the eve of the World War the Kiel shipyards were launching U boats at the rate of one a month. They were turning out field howitzers and heavy mortars by the score. Mass production was underway for the multi-purpose 88 mm anti-aircraft cum anti-tankgun, which was to cause notoriety in Greece and North Africa. From 35,000 employees in 1932<sup>37</sup> there was a rise to 112,000 by 1938. Although only 26% of these workers were engaged in armaments (40% in 1914), the House of Krupp was fast becoming the nerve center of German<sup>38</sup> ballistics.

Unlike the first war the German people were immersed in goals of the Nazi state. They played a significant role in promoting militarism through their coalition with industry and government. Although Hitler detracted from arms research this<sup>39</sup> was far from the case in regard to production. By a continual line of propaganda he convinced his people that each could engage in developments where science had left off. The German excellence in mechanical things would triumph over the "victors' restrictions". As a result, the pocket battleship was produced concentrating tremendous firing power; an ingenious pistol of a caliber within limits was manufactured; the outstanding sailplanes were executed. Hitler convinced people of their utility in arousing and intimidating enemy states.

Krupp at the same time incited the masses to this banner. They pointed out the nation was not economically

self sufficient and had to import foodstuffs and raw materials. Export of war materials was a German necessity in order to gain credits for the importation of essential supplies. This was <sup>as</sup> big <sup>as</sup> business as an American auto industry. For as many American firms maintain large labs for their own economic gain the Firmen Institute owned by Krupp had large proving grounds. <sup>40</sup> There would seem to be one concrete difference. Weapons development involves a cloak of secrecy to protect the plans from a potential enemy.

In return for Krupp's role in socio-economic realms the Nazi's honored him with hundreds of prizes. The Minister of Economic made him German Fuhrer of Economics, over seven firms in a new economic set up, the Firmen Institute. The Minister of Labor gave him the title "pioneer of Labor". The Minister of Armaments awarded Gustav the "war Cross of Merit". Finally Gustav received a Golden Party Badge from Hitler on his seventieth birthday. More important Hitler had his youth groups dutifully recite around campfires the phrase, "tough as <sup>41</sup> leather, quick as grey hounds, hard as Krupp steel".

But who was the real militarist of the two? Who controlled the arms situation? by the War's end Krupp had learned what Hitler meant by his vow not to abolish private property and free enterprise. "The master in Villa Hueg was downgraded to a part time agent of the State, while Hitler took over. The firm's war material department report of 1942 shows, that Hitler was the "weapon construction expert, who met with department

technicians". He gave criticisms not to Gustav, but to the firms chief technician in charge of gun design, Erich Mueller.<sup>42</sup> Even the new Krupp, Alfred (1907-67) was ignored. This era showed the Krupps in a new position in regards to promoting militarism. The industrialist had all but disappeared in the chain of regnitive power. No longer did he manipulate the ruler or the Army.

It is evident that Krupp joined Hitler like many other Germans under force of threats and under the impact of seductive promises. Since a totalitarian state turns its unpolititisch people into accomplices unless they choose to resist, Krupp became an accomplice. When Germany was defeated so was Krupp.

So it was that in 1945 when the Allies entered Essen Britain's Ernest Douglas Fowlers, who was put in charge of the Ruhr zone, declared, "Not one of these chimneys will ever smoke again". It had been decided by the Big Three at Yalta earlier, that the defeated foe was to make amends. Stalin called for the extermination of hundreds of thousands of Germans and the distrubution of Krupp firms. Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to the latter, using British Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin's statement: "If a fellow shot at me three times (1870, 1914, 1939), I don't see why I should give him a pistol to make sure the fourth time." Thus the Allies formulated Law 27, the breakup of all German cartels as enforced by the Control Commission.<sup>43</sup>

When the Nuremberg Trials began (1946) to take care of crimes perpetrated by Germans, Gustav Krupp was among the names chosen. Because of his age, 74, and senility he could not stand trial. These trials ended and the American counsels began a new set in an attempt to convict the son, Alfried, one of the directors of the firm from 1938. Evidence showed that Herr Krupp, as chairman of the board, "not only accepted but actively sought to employ concentration camp inmates, and for that purpose, built factories near the camps of Markstaedt and Auschwitz. Most damning, General Telford Taylor U.S. War Crimes Persecutor, established:

Krupp used the services in 1945 of 55,000 displaced persons, 18,000 prisoners of war, 6,000 inmates of concentration camps as part of "Extermination by Work Program". 44

Krupp used 520 woman slave laborers right in Essen. They were between 15 and 25 years old, and some had been students in Rumania, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Their clothing was replaced by a single burlap sack. Torn pieces of blankets were wrapped around their legs, and at times, inmates were required to walk barefoot in the snow... After the air raid of December 31, 1944, the girls had to live in a damp cellar. They were <sup>a-</sup> ~~not~~ wakened each morning at 4 a.m. Washing facilities were not available. Only one meal was served each day in the camp. Most of the girls were employed in Rolling Mill II. Their hair was closely cropped or shaved in the form of a cross.' 45

On July 31, 1948, Judge Edward Daley of Connecticut handed down the following judgement:

On the counts of the indictment on which you have been convicted Plunder, Deportation, Exploitation and Abuse of Slave Labor, the tribunal sentences you to imprisonment for twelve years and orders forfeiture of all your property. 46

The reality of world politics sent Americans to a reexamination of the Krupp case. Between 1947-8 the Allies saw the rise of a new threat. France was fighting communism in Indo China, Greece, Czechoslovakia and Poland were combatting this threat to domestic peace. Then Russia took over the Krupp firms in East Berlin and established a blockade against the West. It was evident to many American observers that Germany was not economically strong enough to survive a communist thrust. So it was that just after the Chinese Communists entered the Korean War, Alfried and other Kruppian prisoners<sup>47</sup> heard their sentences were being reviewed.

The incredible then happened. As with Gustav after World War I, the pattern of arrest and early release was repeated in the case of Alfried." On January 30, 1951, U.S. High Commissioner John McCloy commuted the sentence to time already served and restored to Alfried his full property rights." Three days later he was released and received by his relatives, "who swamped him with daffodils and carried him off to a champagne breakfast!"<sup>48</sup> One reporter asked him whether he would again produce cannons. And Krupp answered, "I hope it will never again be necessary, but what a factory produces depends not only on the will of the owner, but on the politics of its government."<sup>49</sup>

This move enraged the British. They cited "expediency": if the Soviet threat hadn't increased Krupp would be paying for his crimes in jail. John McCloy viewed the case from another angle, that of American constitutional law. Had Krupp

personally stolen anything or maltreated anyone? McCloy noted:

Evidence showed that Herr Krupp had committed his crimes at a board meeting. That did not make him any less culpable, but his guilt was that of gross negligence, indifference and weakness of character, rather than that of intentional evil. These were the reasons why his 12 year sentence was commuted into the 6 he had already served (since taken into custody in 1945). In the states a man can be freed after having done one-third his time.

As for Krupp's property McCloy pointed out that if we wanted to seize the works as reparations at the end of the war this would have been a legitimate political decision similar to annexation of territory. What was at stake in restoring the property to Krupp was a legal principle: according to Anglo-Saxon traditions, you cannot punish a man for his crimes by taking his property away.

Nevertheless the McCloy ruling led American diplomats in August, 1952 to offer an agreement, whereby Krupp was to be compensated with £25 million for his coal, iron and steel holdings which the Allies had taken. This would get the firm back on the road to stability, thereby contributing "to the defence of Europe".

Once again the British and French viewed the move as a violation of Allied Law 27, which called for the complete breakup of German industrial empires and a bar to the return to ownership of persons who have furthered the aggressive Nazi party". They prepared a March, 1953 agreement with Krupp to ensure themselves the law would be upheld. By this so-called Krupp treaty the firm was to be sliced vertically and horizon-

industrialist Axel Wenner bought control of Bochumer Verein. By a private agreement between Bochumer and Krupp firms the<sup>54</sup> Konstantin was returned to Krupp in 1958. As for the other mines in the Ruhr complex no offer has met with Krupp demands. One Dutch offer of \$2.5 million comes no where near its value of \$300 million. Thus the 1953 Krupp treaty, as an unprecedented commercial treaty between a private individual and three sovereign powers, proved an immediate failure. "It showed the now internationally accepted uniqueness of the House of Krupp."<sup>55</sup> It was evident the restrictions of the agreement were as unenforceable as similar attempts against the Krupps after World War I.

In the meantime Krupp had surveyed his property in 1951 and found one third of his steel works had been destroyed by bombings and much had been dismantled by the conquering Russian armies. He found it would take a half billion dollars to restore the company to its 1943 conditions. General tax credits by the German government supplied a good part of the funds.<sup>56</sup> Krupp workers bought shares so as to help. Alfried chose Berthold Beitz in 1954 a manager. "Only 39, he was one of the energetic, shirt-sleeved young men, who came to the top of German business after the war." He was called "the American" by the method he got things done without the German rules of formality.<sup>57</sup>

While the Allied wisely permitted the revival of Ruhr steelmaking, Beitz carried it out. He wrought for Krupp and ? vague

tally to eliminate any possibility of reestablishing military industrial trade. Under the terms of the accord Krupp pledged to sell his entire coal, steel and iron assets before 1960. He could never reinvest in these commodities. "In return the Allies lifted all controls on the other branches of his industrial empire, including shipyards, locomotive plants, and an array of other companies! The deal left Krupp with \$140 million, making him once again one of the richest men in Europe.<sup>52</sup>

The British and French were convinced his signature would be legally and morally binding. But Krupp had his lawyers signed. He felt he was not at all bound by a pledge which had been extorted under duress- threat of losing his fortune. His lawyers pointed out this violated the moral code.<sup>53</sup> Second, the promise never again to engage in steelmaking violated the equality of citizens before the law.<sup>54</sup> Further, the Federal Constitution written by the Allies granted every West German the right to enter any occupation. Therefore the German government stated it could not withhold Alfried from undertaking business dealings in coal and steel.<sup>55</sup> Third, the promise to sell the major steel plant at Rheinhausen and all coal mines within five years at a reasonable price proved ambiguous. Krupp could discourage prospective purchasers on the claim that the price was not right.<sup>56</sup> Take for example the Konstantin mine which was bought in 1956 by Bochumer Verein, a Ruhr steel firm. Secretly, an old Krupp friend, Swedish

Germany an Economic Miracle or Wirtschaftswunder of the 1950's. The House obtained immense returns from German and CSC markets,<sup>57</sup> By 1961 Krupp held 40% of West Germany's market in power shovels, 36% of the share in electric locomotives, 33% in air-<sup>58</sup> plane manufacture, 12% in cranes. His wares included bridges, diesel engines, ships, honey, stainless steel teeth. Less than \$30 million of the firm's \$1.3 billion in sales in 1962 re-<sup>59</sup> sulted from military production of radar, trucks and aircraft.

<sup>1950-45</sup> In the same decade Beitz had moved Krupp again outside the European markets. He aimed at aiding underdeveloped nations. He organized fantastic deals: Brazil gained a major machine shop industry; Columbia built fourteen span bridges; Steel mills popped up in India, Pakistan, Brazil; Guinea was aided in developing a harbor; Syria received help in planning a dam and Greece in building an oil refinery. In a matter of years the House of Krupp had invested \$250 million in 22 under-<sup>60</sup> developed countries. It was an investment reaping admiration from world powers as well as profits.

Beitz' tremendous achievement was permission from the Russian government to open a Krupp office in Moscow- no other ~~country~~ <sup>firm</sup> in the West has been able to do so. With exports at \$200 million in 1962 trade with the Soviet bloc amounted to \$7 million. The market, says Beitz, could be expanded ten fold,<sup>61</sup> thereby improving diplomatic relations."

Then came the idea for an agreement with Poland. "I think we owe it to Poland to help them build their country again," remarked Beitz. In 1965 an industrial complex manned by the

Poles but managed by the Krupps, was established. A Krupp team of 250 trained the workers. The Polish government was then to choose which of the 3000 industrial products from the Krupp catalogue they wished to produce. Krupp equipment and management coupled with Polish buildings and staff. The partners should split profits from sales of peaceful products. This idea of "co-production" looks like an ingenious way for Krupp to expand business with Communist countries. Such deals could be a move toward a new foreign policy for Germany. with agreements assuring wages, housing and quasi-diplomatic privileges for Krupp managees in communist countries, there will have to be a revocation of the Hallstein Doctrine. According to this document West Germany will not recognize any country(except Russia) that has diplomatic relations with East Germany- Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia. The House of Krupp aims to eliminate the the militaristic fears that all states are natural enemies by economic intercourse.

### Part III The Krupp Trauma

Pursuit of trade with the Soviet bloc leads one to surmise a possible reactionary movement of the House of Krupp. In 1869 Alfred Krupp refused to let Wilhelm I halt his sales to Napoleon III and other enemies of Germany ready to attack it. In 1959 Alfred Krupp refused to let German Chancellor Adenauer halt his sales to Khrushchev and other enemies of democracy and freedom. Norbert Muhlen contends this unpolitisch business is shortsighted in regard to responsibility to the world community to oppose the communist threat. It is as Oswald Spengler points out, "Creative humans who build cultures are eventually replaced by manipulators who in the name of profits push toward concentrations of power", which destroy the culture.<sup>64</sup> Peter Batty backs up this statement with some facts. "When Krupp was sentenced at Nuremberg in July, 1948 he became penniless; almost twenty years later he was a multi-millionaire, with a spendable income each year of 7 digits! Krupp had prospered even at Germany's loss. It was as Leon Blum used to say, "The greatest industrialists of Europe are the only ones to survive the cataclysms that periodically shake the continent."<sup>65</sup>

The crux of the issue lies in the means Krupp has used to regain his position. Has there been a rehabilitating trend through the production of peaceful goods? Statistics show that of the 30 divisions of Krupp, coal and steel are produced in amounts equal to only 30% of the company's total business. These products are used at the Krupp shipyards (including German

many's second largest) and to supply the Federal Railway with locomotives. Krupp also employed his products in the Flugtechnische Werke in Bremen, which accounts for one third of German aviation production, and is 40% Krupp owned.<sup>66</sup> Krupp is not rearming Germany at the present time.

Many observers fear for the future. The Krupps have never relinquished their immense power over the people of the Ruhr, the German government or their Armed Forces. "Industrialist power is still concentrated in the hands of a few," says Thomas Prittie, and thus retains the "arrogance of Germany's past".<sup>67</sup> This is evident by the skillful operations of Krupp and others in regard to the Allied Law 27. Then too consider how Krupp has avoided compliance with the 15 year old Allied order to sell coal and steel properties. As the news magazine, Der Spiegel asserted in an article about Krupp, February 28, 1968, "German industry deemed it a matter of honor not to bid for Krupp holdings". The Fred Krupp GmbH corporation formed in January, 1968, from the sprawling Krupp family holdings considered the Allied order of 1953 invalid. West Germany as a member of the EEC and ESC must concentrate production into larger and more efficient units. The divestment order would be contrary to the decision of the Common Market organization.<sup>68</sup>

Will the resurgent Germany then start to manufacture munitions, although Krupp himself has voluntarily pledged not to? Will West Germany's alliance with the West against Russia change the situation? Is the U.S. powerless to enforce the 1953 order because of tie-ups in Vietnam? Or do the present

trends in the Ruhr portend the building of a fervent defender of Europe?

Today Germans still want supremacy of their country as a European power. But the end to the goal no longer seems to be through "tools of war". <sup>M</sup>uhlen claims there are several reasons. The first is psychological. Since the arms trade has so often plunged Germany into the horrors of world war, the people are not anxious to repeat the experience. The second is rational. Germans see their new status as a second rate power under three giants, Russian, China and the U.S. She must join with her neighbors to provide a bulwark for European power. The youth of Germany have grown up in this new era and seem to be awake to their responsibilities as members of the Western community. <sup>69</sup>

But the Krupps will also have their say. Are they as strong as in past generation? In 1967, the firm in time of peace without tremendous arms markets was near bankruptcy. Perhaps Beitz was too good a dealer, for he couldn't finance what he sold. Manufacturing operations were too varied (prefab houses, high temperature reactors to wines and false teeth), too numerous (3000 products), or too small to be profitable. Exportation to underdeveloped countries had involved Krupp in cut-throat competition. Economic Minister Karl Schihee and Finance Minister Franz Strauss offered the ailing firm \$138 million in government and bank credits. Krupp in return was required to change the firm into a share com-

pany by 1968, and had to publish balance sheets for coal and steel manufacture. Finally, Alfried's thirty year old son, Arndt, renounced the Krupp name and authority in the company in return for a \$500,000 a year settlement from the firm. <sup>70</sup>

Yet after all is said the Krupp saga lives as the phoenix amidst universal fear and distrust. Many are suspicious that the firm, which has played a role in the unhappy history of our times, will once again invoke the creed of militarism. The men at the top have changed, but how can one be sure their attitudes have likewise changed? The products are different, but are the principles? This has been and will be the <sup>as to whether</sup> criteria <sup>will again</sup> for the House of Krupp in promoting German militarism.

## FOOTNOTE-PAGE

<sup>1</sup>Robert Goldsmith, A League to Enforce Peace, p. 190.  
see Max Harden the German editor in the NY Times, N 8'1916.

<sup>2</sup>Norbert Muhlen, The Incredible Krupps, p.45. Fredrich Krupp(1787-1826) manufactured cast steel. His son Alfred (1812-87) was the Cannon King who produced in 1847 a three pound steel gun, and a two ton ingot for the London Exposition. After this renown he received orders from other nations- the arms race began. France bought to protect herself against Bismarck; Belguim who saw her independence threatened bought artillery; Russia took the biggest order with 120 cannons. This \$1 million deal put him in Big Industry's ranks and attracted Wilhelm to enlist Krupp aid in the Franco-Prussian conflict. of 1870-71

<sup>3</sup>Ibid., p.85.

<sup>4</sup>Ibid., p.109.

<sup>5</sup>Bernhard Menne, Lords of Essen, p.159.

<sup>6</sup>Muhlen, op.cit., p.108.

<sup>7</sup>Menne, op.cit., p.215. An extract from the Millionaires Annual of 1913 shows the five wealthiest in Germany were: Frau Bertha Krupp von Bohlen with 283 million marks; Prince Henckel von Donnersmack- 254 million marks; Baron von Rothschild- 163; Duke of Ujest- 154; Emperor Wilhem II- 140.

<sup>8</sup>Arthur Rosenberg, Birth of the German Republic, p.53.

<sup>9</sup>Goldsmith, op.cit., p.237.

<sup>10</sup>Menne, op.cit., p.255.

<sup>11</sup>Ibid., p.287.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., p.190.

<sup>13</sup>Ibid., p.241.

<sup>14</sup>Ibid., p.293.

<sup>15</sup>Murray Robertson, Krupp's International Arms Ring, p.135.

<sup>16</sup>Goldsmith, op. cit., p.192. See Treitschke's Politics, II.

<sup>17</sup>Walter Goerlitz, History of German Staff, p.126.

<sup>18</sup>Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan, p.9.

<sup>19</sup>Goerlitz, op.cit., p.145.

<sup>20</sup>Menne, op.cit., p.184.

<sup>21</sup>Ibid., p.227.

- 22 Muhlen, Incredible Krupps, p.129
- 23 Peter Batty, The House of Krupp, p.145.
- 24 Muhlen, op.cit., p.137.
- 25 Batty, op.cit., p.145.
- 26 Muhlen, op.cit., p.142.
- 27 Batty, op.cit., p.143.
- 28 Goerlitz, History of the German Staff, p.247.
- 29 Batty, op.cit., p.149.
- 30 Muhlen, loc.cit.
- 31 Goerlitz, op.cit., p.244.
- 32 Ibid., p.252.
- 33 Muhlen, op.cit., p.145.
- 34 Batty, op.cit., p.156.
- 35 Muhlen, op.cit., p.153. Schacht as he later described it in an autobiography hoped to put brakes on the Nazis and move them to a moderate course. When he was asked 15 years later in a court why he as a lion entered the big lion's cage, he answered, "I entered not as a little lion, but as a lion trainer.
- 36 Batty, op.cit., p.158.
- 37 Ibid., p.159.
- 38 J. Bell, "Comeback of the Krupps", Fortune, Feb'56, p.106.
- 39 Leslie Simon, German Research in Ballistics in World War II, p.48.
- 40 Ibid., p.51.
- 41 Bell, loc.cit.
- 42 Muhlen, op.cit., p. 165.
- 43 "How Deep Are Krupp's Financial Problem?", Business Week, Mar 11'67, p.128.

44 T. Prittie, "Krupp's Empire, Germany Divided", Atlantic, O'60, p. 81.

45 G.W.Herald, "The Peculiar Case of Alfred Krupp", UN World, Ap'53, p.45.

46 Idem.

47 Batty, House of Krupps, p.230.

48 Herald, op.cit., p.44.

49 Muhlen, Incredible Krupps, p.223.

50 Herald, op.cit., p.47.

51 Prittie, op.cit., p.88. Deconcentration failed. Before the war there were 8 trusts controlling 94% of German steel production. After the war 6 firms controlling 80% expanded in Germany.

52 Herald, op.cit., p.45.

53 Batty, op.cit., p.243.

54 "Krupp: Father or Child of History?", Newsweek, S 23'63, p.81.

55 "Krupp Forges New German Trade Weapon With Poland", Businessweek, F 6'65, p.94.

56 "Krupp: Father or Child of History?" Newsweek, p.81

57 F. Sondern, "Remarkable Rebirth", Readers Digest, S'55, p. 162. Beitz was the son of a minor government official. He worked for Shell Oil in Hamburg after high school and refused to join the Nazi Party. His ability was such that he was exempted from military duty during the war and sent, at 27, to manage the Boryslav oil fields in occupied Poland. Allied investigation has revealed Beitz spent more time there protecting Poles against Nazi persecution than producing oil. After the war he became head of an insurance company, and was drawing a large salary when he met Alfred.

58 Batty, op.cit., p.258.

59 "Krupp: Father or Child of History?", Newsweek, p.81.

60 Idem.

61 Idem.

<sup>62</sup>"Ideal Plan for Industrial Complex in Poland",  
Newsweek, F 15'65, p.68.

<sup>63</sup>Muhlen, Incredible Krupps, p.288.

<sup>64</sup>J.S. Martin, "Rebirth of the Krupps", Nation, Mr 21'59,  
p.245.

<sup>65</sup>Batty, House of Krupps, p.324.

<sup>66</sup>"Krupp Forges New German Trade Weapon With Poland", Bus-  
iness Week, F 6'65, p.94.

<sup>67</sup>Prittie, Atlantic, p.88.

<sup>68</sup>"Krupp Concern Considers Occupation Order Invalid",  
Providence Journal, F 29'68, p.1.

<sup>69</sup>Muhlen, op.cit., p.289.

<sup>70</sup>"Krupp New Men of Iron", Businessweek, Ag 12'67, p. 108.

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