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Appendix A

Map of Afghanistan

Source: "Afghanistan ." 24 September 2009. CIA World Factbook . <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/af.html>.

Appendix B
Map of Pakistan

Source: “Pakistan.” 24 September 2009. CIA World Factbook .
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html>

Appendix C
Profile of Madrassas Education in Pakistan

Number of secondary and higher madrassas	6,000
Senior and graduate level madrassas	4,335
Deobandi madrassas	2,333
Barelvi madrassas	1,625
Ahl-i-Hadith madrassas	224
Shia madrassas	163

Number of all students	604,421
Local students (Pakistan)	586, 604
Foreign students (Includes Afghan Students)	17, 817
Afghan students	16,598

Source: Ahmad, M. (2004). Madrassa Eduction in Pakistan and Bangladesh. In S. P. Limaye, R. G. Wirsing, & M. Malik (Eds.), *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia* (pp. 101-115). Honolulu, HI, USA: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies .

Appendix D
Darul Uloom Haqqania Madrassa

The school was established by Maulana Abdul Haq in 1947. It is located in Khatak, some 29 miles south of Peshawar, Pakistan, about a 2-hour drive from the border of Afghanistan. The school has trained all but one of Afghanistan's 10 top leaders. Taliban high command travels to Khatak once a year to participate in graduation ceremonies. The campus is often the venue for conclaves of mullahs throughout the Muslim world. It has a student body between 2,000 and 4,000 from all of the Muslim nations. It is Islam's most fundamentalist oriented institute of learning. Over 1 million fatwa's have been issued from here, including the fatwa that declared *jihad* (holy war) against the Soviet Union during its invasion of Afghanistan. Today, most of the schools funding is thought to come from the Persian Gulf.

Source: Long, Justin. "Darul Uloom Haqqania: Training Camp for Islamic Leaders, Afghani Taliban." 11 June 2001. The Network of Strategic Missions. <http://www.strategicnetwork.org/index.php?loc=kb&view=v&id=5608&fto=403&>.

Appendix E
Casualties by Year in the War in Afghanistan



Source: iCasualties.org. 9 December 2009. 6 December 2009. < http://icasualties.org/>.

Appendix F
Mullah Mohammad Omar

Despite his high profile little is known about Mullah Omar. Few photos, none official, exist of him. Born in 1959, Omar was the son of a peasant farmer. He grew up in a mud hut around the village of Singesar, near Kandahar, and is a Pashtun belonging to the Hotak tribe.

Omar fought as a guerilla with the Harakat-I inqilab-I Islamic faction of the anti-Soviet mujahedeen. It is reported that he is thin, tall (around 6 feet) and strong built. Being wounded four times he lost one of his eyes in either 1986 or 1989. Taliban lore has it that, upon being wounded by a piece of shrapnel, Omar removed his own eye and sewed the eyelid shut. However, reports from a Red Cross facility near the Pakistan border indicate that Omar was treated there of the injury, where his eye was surgically removed. After being disabled during the war against the Soviets, Omar studied and taught in madrassas in the Pakistan city of Quetta.

Until 1994, when he rose to power reluctantly, he was relatively unknown in Afghanistan. He started the Taliban for two reasons. One reason was after Allah visited him in a dream asking Omar to lead the faithful. Also, Omar was horrified by the behavior of former mujahedeen commanders that he had fought alongside from 1989 to 1992. So, Omar, along with thirty ethnic Pashtun followers, picked up the gun at first to stop four notorious mujahedeen who were raping women near Omar's village. This later led into bring law and order to the entire country of Afghanistan. The idea was to create a Muslim state that would perfectly practice a strict interpretation of the Koran, one taught in the fundamentalist madrassas of Pakistan, where Omar went to school.

Omar ruled Afghanistan, under the Taliban regime, from 1996 to 2001. During his reign he rarely left Kandahar or met with outsiders. He relied heavily upon his Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil. In 1996, as Taliban power over Afghanistan increased, Omar accepted the title of "Amirul Momineen" or "commander of the faithful".

After the the Taliban was ousted from Afghanistan, Omar fled the country and is now believed to me hidding in the Afghan-Pakistan border region.

Source: Marquand, Robert. "The reclusive ruler who runs the Taliban." 21 October 2001. The Christian Science Monitor. 13 October 2009 <http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1010/p1s4-wosc.html>.

Appendix G

Taliban Stronghold and Presence along the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan



Source: BBC. "Pakistan conflict map." 22 June 2009. BBC News. 13 October 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8046577.stm>.

Appendix H

A Comparative Chart of Madrassa Students Opinions, 2003 (%)

Question		Response	Madrassas	Urdu-Medium Schools	English-Medium Schools	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools
1.	**Take Kashmir away from India by an open war**	Yes	59.86	39.56	25.86	36.92
		No	31.69	53.04	64.66	60.00
		Don't Know	8.45	7.39	9.48	3.08
2.	**Take Kashmir away from India by supporting jihadi groups to fight the Indian army**	Yes	52.82	33.04	22.41	53.08
		No	32.39	45.22	60.34	40.00
		Don't Know	14.79	21.74	17.24	6.92
3.	**Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (no war or sending of jihadi groups across the Line of Control)**	Yes	33.80	75.65	72.41	56.15
		No	54.93	18.26	18.97	36.92
		Don't Know	11.27	6.09	8.62	6.92
4.	**Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs, etc.**	Yes	12.68	46.95	65.52	41.54
		No	82.39	36.95	9.48	36.92
		Don't Know	4.93	16.09	25.00	21.54

5.	**Give equal rights to all Pakistani Hindus in all jobs etc.**	Yes	16.90	47.39	78.45	64.62
		No	76.06	42.61	13.79	31.54
		Don't Know	7.04	10.00	7.76	3.85
6.	**Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs, etc.**	Yes	18.31	65.65	83.62	76.92
		No	73.24	26.52	8.62	18.46
		Don't Know	8.45	7.83	7.76	4.62
7.	**Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries**	Yes	16.90	75.22	90.52	67.69
		No	77.46	17.39	6.03	25.38
		Don't Know	5.63	7.39	3.45	6.92

Source: Rahman, Tariq. "Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Suvery of Students and Teachers at Pakistan's Urdu and English Language-Medium Schools, and Madrassas." Contemporary South Asia 13.3 (2004): 307-326.

Appendix I

A Comparative Chart of Madrassas Teachers Opinions, 2003 (%)

Question		Response	Madrassas	Urdu-Medium Schools	English-Medium Schools	Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools
1.	**Take Kashmir away from India by an open war**	Yes	70.37	20	26.15	19.61
		No	22.22	70	64.62	68.63
		Don't Know	7.41	10	9.23	11.76
2.	**Take Kashmir away from India by supporting jihadi groups to fight in the Indian army**	Yes	59.26	19	38.46	39.22
		No	29.63	68	50.77	52.94
		Don't Know	11.11	13	10.77	7.84
3.	**Support Kashmir cause through peaceful means only (no war or sending jihadi groups across the Line of Control)**	Yes	29.63	85	60.00	66.66
		No	66.67	10	33.85	19.61
		Don't Know	3.70	5	6.15	13.73
4.	**Give equal rights to Ahmedis in all jobs, etc.**	Yes	3.70	27	43.07	29.41
		No	96.30	65	36.92	62.75
		Don't Know	0.00	8	20.00	7.84

5.	**Give equal rights to Pakistani Hindus in all jobs, etc.**	Yes	14.81	37	61.54	60.78
		No	85.19	58	26.15	35.29
		Don't Know	0.00	8	20.00	7.84
6.	**Give equal rights to Pakistani Christians in all jobs, etc.**	Yes	18.52	52	81.54	60.78
		No	77.77	42	10.77	33.33
		Don't Know	3.70	6	7.69	5.88
7.	**Give equal rights to men and women as in Western countries**	Yes	3.70	61	78.46	37.25
		No	96.30	33	13.85	58.82
		Don't Know	0.00	6	7.69	3.92

Source: Rahman, Tariq. "Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Suvery of Students and Teachers at Pakistan's Urdu and English Language-Medium Schools, and Madrassas." Contemporary South Asia 13.3 (2004): 307-326.

Appendix J

Differences in Cost in Major Types of Educational Institutions in Pakistan, 2003 (Rupees)

Institution	Average Cost per Student per Year (Rs.)	Funders	Cost to the State per Student per Year (Rs.)
Madrassa	5714 (includes board and lodging)	Philanthropists and religious organizations	None reported (except some subsidies on computers, books and other educational material in some madrassas)
Urdu-Medium	2264.5 (only tuition)	The state	2264.5
Cadet Colleges/ Public Schools	90,061 (includes tuition and all facilities)	Parents and the state (average of six cadet colleges and one public)	14,171 (average of five cadet colleges only)
English-Medium Schools	96,000 for 'A'-level (tuition only) 36,000 for other levels (tuition only)	Parents	None reported (except for the provision of subsidized land in some cantonments)

Source: Rahman, Tariq. "Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Suvery of Students and Teachers at Pakistan's Urdu and English Language-Medium Schools, and Madrassas." Contemporary South Asia 13.3 (2004): 307-326.

Appendix K

Cost per School Year for a Student per Type of School in Pakistan, 2003 (Rupees)



This chart shows the cost of each student per year between all the different types of schools in Pakistan. Out fo the four types of schools, madrassas are the only ones that are completely free to the students who attend. Madrassa education is free because of zakat.

Source: Rahman, Tariq. "Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Suvery of Students and Teachers at Pakistan's Urdu and English Language-Medium Schools, and Madrassas." Contemporary South Asia 13.3 (2004): 307-326.

Appendix L
Timeline of Conflict in Afghanistan from 1839 Onwards

1839 (March)	First Anglo-Afghan War
1857	Afghanistan declares war on Persia
1878 (January)	Second Anglo-Afghan War
1880	Abdur Rahman Khan was officially recognized as Amir of Afghanistan.
1901 (February 20)	Habibullah Khan, son of Abdur Rahman Khan, is assassinated. His son Amanullah Khan declares himself king.
1901 (May)	Ammanullah Khan leads an attack against the British and starts the Third Anglo- Afghan War
1919	Afghanistan regains independence after third war against British forces trying to bring country under their sphere of influence
1926	Ammanullah Khan attempts to introduce social reforms leading to opposition from conservative forces
1929 (January)	Ammanullah flees after civil unrest over his reforms. Amir Habibullah Kalakani took power with the help of various Pashtun tribes.
1929	The reactionary Mohammed Nadir Shah takes control of Afghanistan.
1933 (November 8)	Zahir Shah becomes king after his father Mohammed Nadir Shah is assassinated and Afghanistan remains a monarchy for next four decades
1953	General Mohammed Daud becomes prime minister. Turns to Soviet Union for economic and military assistance. Introduces a number of social reforms, such as abolition of purdah (practice of secluding women from public view)

1963	Mohammed Daud forced to resign as prime minister
1964	Constitutional monarchy introduced but leads to political polarization and power struggles
1973	Mohammed Daud seizes power in a coup and declares a republic. Tries to play off Soviet Union against Western powers. His style alienates left-wing factions who join forces against him
1978	General Daud is overthrown and killed in a coup by leftist People's Democratic Party. But party's Khalq and Parcham factions fall out, leading to purging or exile of most Parcham leaders. At the same time, conservative Islamic and ethnic leaders who object to social changes begin armed revolt in countryside.
1979	Power struggle between leftist leaders Hafizullah Amin and Nur Mohammed Taraki in Kabul won by Amin. Revolts in countryside continue and Afghan army faces collapse. Soviet Union finally sends in troops to help remove Amin, who is executed.
1980	Babrak Karmal, leader of the People's Democratic Party Parcham faction, is installed as ruler, backed by Soviet troops. But anti-regime resistance intensifies with various mujahedeen groups fight soviet forces. US, Pakistan, China, Iran and Saudi Arabia supply money and arms.
1985	Mujahedeen come together in Pakistan to form alliance against Soviet forces. Half of Afghan population now estimated to be displaced by war, with many pleading to neighboring Iran or Pakistan. New Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev says he will withdraw troops from Afghanistan.
1986	US begins supplying mujahedeen with Stinger missiles, enabling them to shoot down Soviet helicopter gunship. Babrak Karmal replaced by Najibullah as head of Soviet-backed regime.
1988	Afghanistan, Soviet Union, the US, and Pakistan sign a peace accords and Soviet Union begins

	pulling out troops.
1989	Last Soviet troops leave, but civil war continues as mujahedeen push to overthrow Najibullah.
1991	US and Soviet Union agree to end military aid on both sides.
1992	Resistance closes in on Kabul and Najibullah falls from power. Rival militias vie for influence.
1993	Mujahedeen factions agree on formation of a government with ethnic Tajik, Burhanuddin Rabbani, proclaimed president.
1994	Factional contest continue and the Pashtun-dominated Taliban emerge as major challenge to the Rabbani government.
1996	Taliban seize control of Kabul and introduce hard-line version of Islam, banning women from work, and introducing Islamic punishments, which include stoning to death and amputations. Rabbani flees to join anti-Taliban northern alliance.
1997	Taliban recognized as legitimate rulers by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Most other countries continue to regard Rabbani as head of state. Taliban now control about two0thirds of country.
1998	Earthquakes kill thousands of people. US launches missile strikes at suspected bases of militant Osama bin Laden, accused of bombing US embassies in Africa.
1999	UN imposes an air embargo and financial sanction to force Afghanistan to hand over Osama bin Laden for trial.
2001 (January)	UN imposes further sanction on Taliban to force them to hand over Osama bin Laden
2001 (March)	Taliban blows up giant Buddha statues in defiance of international efforts to save them.
2001 (September 11)	Al Qaeda launches a terrorist attack against the US

2001 (October)	US, Britain launch air strikes against Afghanistan after Taliban refuse to hand over Osama bin Laden, held responsible for the September 11 attacks on the US.
2001 (November)	Coalition forces seize Mazar-e Sharif and within days march into Kabul and other key cities
2001 (December 5)	Afghanistan groups agree deal in Bonn for interim government
2001 (December 7)	Taliban finally give up last stronghold of Kandahar, but Mullar Omar remains at large.
2001 (December 22)	Hamid Karzai is sworn in as head of a 30-member interim power-sharing government
2002 (January)	First contingent of foreign peacekeepers in place.
2002 (April)	Former king Zahir Shah returns, but says he makes no claim to the thrown
2002 (May)	UN Security Council extended mandate of ISAF until December 2002 Allied forces continue their military campaign to find remnants of al Qaeda and Taliban forces.
2002 (June)	Loya Jirga, or grand council, elects Hamid Karzai as interim head of state. Karzai picks members of his administration which is to serve until 2004.
2002 (July)	Vice President Haji Abdul Qadir is assassinated by gunmen in Kabul.
2002 (September)	Karzai narrowly escapes an assassination attempt in Kandahar.
2003 (August)	NATO takes control of security in Kabul, its first ever operational commitment outside of Europe.
2004 (January)	Loya Jirga adopts new constitution which provides for strong presidency.
2004 (October-November)	Presidential elections: Hamid Karzai is declared winner, with 55% of the vote. He is sworn in, amid tight security, in December.

2005 (May)	Details emerge of alleged prisoner abuse by US forces at detention centers.
New Parliament	
2005 (September)	First parliamentary and provincial election in more than 30 years.
2005 (December)	New parliament holds it inaugural session.
2006 (May)	Violent anti-US protest in Kabul, the worst since the fall of the Taliban in 2001, erupt after a US military vehicle crashes and kills several people.
2006 (May-June)	Scores of people are killed in battles between Taliban fighters and Afghan and coalition forces in the south during an offensive known as Operation Mountain Thrust.
2006 (July onwards)	NATO troops take over the leadership of military operations in the south. Fierce fighting ensues as the forces try to extend government control in areas where Taliban influence is strong.
2006 (October)	NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force
2007 (March)	Pakistan says it has arrested Mullah Obaidullah Akhund the third most senior member of the Taliban's leadership council. NATO and Afghan forces launch Operation Achilles, said to be their largest offensive to date against the Taliban in the south. There is heavy fighting in Helmand province.
2007 (May)	Taliban's most senior military commander, Mullah Dadullah, is killed during fighting with U.S., and Afghan forces.
2007 (July)	Former King Zahir Shah dies.
2007 (November)	A suicide attack on a parliamentary delegation kills at least 41 in northern town of Baghlan, in the countries worse such attack.

2008 (April)	NATO leaders meeting in Bucharest say peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is their top priority. They pledge a “firm and shared long-term commitment” there.
2008 (June)	President Karzai warns that Afghanistan will send troops into Pakistan to fight militants if Islamabad fails take action against them.
2008 (September)	President Bush sends an extra 4,500 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a “quite surge”.
2008 (October)	Germany extends Afghanistan mission to 2009 and boosts troop number in Afghanistan by 1,000 to 4,500
2008 (November)	Taliban militants reject an offer of peace talks from President Karzai, saying there can be no negotiations until foreign troops leave Afghanistan.
2008 (December)	President Karzai and new Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari agree to form joint strategy to fight militants operating in their border regions.
2009 (January)	U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates tells Congress that Afghanistan is new U.S. administration’s “greatest test”.
2009 (February)	Up to 20 NATO countries pledge to increase military and other commitments in Afghanistan after the U.S. announces the increase of an extra 17,000 troops.
2009 (March)	President Barrack Obama unveils a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat what he calls an increasingly perilous situation. An extra 4,000 U.S. personnel will train and bolster the Afghan army and police, and there also will be support for civilian development.
2009 (May)	U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates replaces commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, with General Stanley McChrystal, saying the battle against the Taliban needs “new thinking”.

	U.S. military says a U.S. - Afghan force arrested 60 militant and captured more than 100 tonnes of drugs in Helmand province, in the largest drug seizure since foreign troops arrive in 2001.
2009 (July)	U.S. army launches major offensive against the Taliban's heartland in southern Helmand province, involving about 4,000 Marines and 650 Afghan soldiers.
2009 (August)	Presidential and provincial elections are held, but are marred by widespread Taliban attack, patchy turnout and claims of serious fraud.
2009 (September)	Leaked report by the commander of U.S. forces, General McChrystal, says the war against the Taliban could be lost within 12 months unless there are significant increases in troop numbers.
2009 (October)	President Karzai is declared winner of the August presidential election, after second-placed opponent pulls out before the second round. The British government says it will send 500 more military personnel to Afghanistan.
2009 (November)	President Karzai is sworn in for a second term as president. President Obama announces the increase of an additional 30,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan.

Source: BBC News. "Timeline: Afghanistan." 3 November 2009. BBC News. 16 November 2009 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1162108.stm>.

Appendix M
Madrassah Organization

Name of Wafaq	Masalak (Sect or Sub-sect)	Date Founded	Location of Markaz
Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Arabia Pakistan	Sunni-Hanafi-Deobandi (known as Deobandi)	1959	Multan
Tanzeem-ul-Madaris	Sunni-Hanafi-Barelvi (known as Barelvi)	1960	Lahore
Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia	Sunni-Ahle-e-Hadiths (known as Salafi)	1955	Faisalabad
Rabitatual Madaris-al-Islamiya	Jamaat-i-Islami	1983	Mansoora (Lahore)
Wafaq-ul-Madaris-shia (Shia)	Shia	1959	Lahore

Madrassas in Pakistan are broken down into five wafaq, boards that regulate the activities of a madrassa. Each wafaq has a masalak. A masalak refers to the sect or sub-sect of Islam that each wafaq practices within its union of madrassas. The wafaq, wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Arabia Pakistan and Masalak Sunni-Hanafi-Deobandi are the madrassas most commonly associated with the Taliban.

Source: Fair, C. Christine. The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan. Washington, DC: Endowment of the United States Institute of Peace, 2008.

Appendix N

Political Cartoon:
Madrassas Graduate Jihadist

Source: Nicholson, Peter. "Abu Bakar Bashir bombing terrorism Marriott Hotel madrassa." 21 July 2009. Nicholson Cartoons . 17 November 2009 < http://www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au>

Appendix O

Excerpts for a Speech Given by General Stanley McChrystal on October 1, 2009 in London England at the International Institute of Strategic Studies

"I arrived in Afghanistan in May 2002 and I have spent a part of every year since then involved in the effort. I have learned a tremendous amount about it and, every day, I realize how little about Afghanistan I actually understand. I discount immediately anyone who simplifies the problem or offers a solution, because they have absolutely no idea of the complexity of what we are dealing with."

"If you build a well in the wrong place in a village, you may have shifted the basis of power in that village. If you tap into underground water, you give power to the owner of that well that they did not have before, because the traditional irrigation system was community-owned. If you dig a well and contract it to one person or group over another, you make a decision that, perhaps in your ignorance, tips the balance of power, or perception thereof, in that village."

"There is another complexity that people do not understand and which the military have to learn: I call it 'COIN mathematics'. Intelligence will normally tell us how many insurgents are operating in an area. Let us say that there are 10 in a certain area. Following a military operation, two are killed. How many insurgents are left? Traditional mathematics would say that eight would be left, but there may only be two, because six of the living eight may have said, 'This business of insurgency is becoming dangerous so I am going to do something else.'

There are more likely to be as many as 20, because each one you killed has a brother, father, son and friends, who do not necessarily think that they were killed because they were doing something wrong. It does not matter – you killed them."

"In terms of real truths, it is complex, difficult terrain, both in terms of land and people. It is also a tribal society with a culture that is vastly different from what most of us are familiar with. There are variations around the country; you cannot assume that what is true in one province is true in another. That goes for ethnic, geographic and economic issues. You cannot even assume that what is true in one valley is true in the next any more than you can assume that one neighborhood in London is exactly the same as another. We would not generalize here, yet sometimes, as outsiders, we want to do that."

"I would also remind people that we have been waging a war for eight years, yet the Afghans have been at it for 30. Life expectancy in Afghanistan is 44 years, so not many people remember pre-conflict life in Afghanistan. Of those 30 years, about 10 were spent fighting the Soviets,

followed by six years of 'warlordism' and a further six years of Taliban rule and civil rule, and the last eight years have been eight more years of fighting."

"The society is what I would call 'damaged'. Individuals may not be damaged, but the society is not as it was. It is not so uniformly; nor can you say 'it is all different here'. Tribal structures, relationships and expectations are uncertain now. When you go into a village in a Pashtun area, traditionally you could have predicted what the role and interrelationships of the mullah or the elders would be. That is no longer true. It varies based upon the experience of that area. In some areas, some have disproportionate influence and others have none. Some have been killed. In other cases, elements like the Taliban have come in and completely turned upside down the traditional structures. You can also not assume that traditional structures have disappeared, so you have to go in and learn what the structure is and how people deal with it."

"We also face a crisis of confidence. Afghans are frustrated after the most recent eight years of war, because in 2001 their expectations skyrocketed. Along with the arrival of coalition forces, they expected a positive change. They saw that initially and then waited for other changes – economic development and improvements in governance – that, in many cases, may have been unrealistic but, in many cases, were unmet. Therefore, there was a mismatch between what they had hoped for and what they have experienced. Again, as we learn in all societies, expectations and perceptions often matter as much as the reality."

"The answer to this question depends on who you ask. This is not like a football game with points on a scoreboard; it is more like a political debate, after which both sides announce that they won. That matters because we are not the scorekeepers: not NATO ISAF, not our governments, and not even our press. The perception of all of these entities will matter and they will affect the situation, but ultimately this is going to be decided in the minds and perceptions of the Afghan people of the Afghan government and of the insurgents, whether they can win or are winning, and, most importantly, the perception of the villager who casts his lot with the winner."

*"*Villagers are supremely rational and practical people: they make the decision on who they will support, based upon who can protect them and provide for them what they need. If a villager lives in a remote area where the government or security forces cannot protect them from coercion or harm from insurgents, he will not support the government – it would be illogical. Similarly, if the government cannot provide him with rule of law, the basic ability to adjudicate requirements legally, or just enough services to allow him to pursue a likelihood, it is difficult for him to make a rational decision to support the government. The Taliban is not popular. It does not have a compelling context. What it has is proximity to the people and the ability to provide coercion and, in some cases, things like basic rule of law, based upon the fact that they are there

and can put themselves in that position. The perception of the villager matters in terms of which side he should support, so winning the battle of perception is key."

"A villager recently asked me whether we intended to remain in his village and provide security, to which I confidently promised him that, of course, we would. He looked at me and said, 'Okay, but you did not stay last time."

Source: McCrystal, General Stanely. "Gen. McChrystal's Speech on Afghanistan." London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1 October 2009.