Taiwanese Silicon Shield: A Historical and Empirical Review with Analysis of U.S. Dependence on Taiwan Semiconductors and Probabilistic Risk Analysis of a U.S.-Sino Deterrence Failure Taiwanese Silicon Shield: A Historical and Empirical Review with Analysis of U.S. Dependence on Taiwan Semiconductors and Probabilistic Risk Analysis of a U.S.-Sino Deterrence Failure

Abstract

This dissertation showcases multiple in depth, qualitative historical explanations to evaluate potential contributing factors to the Taiwanese Silicon Shield theory. These factors were showcased in an experimental wargame designed to investigate the strategic implications of global semiconductor production, with a focus on Taiwan’s pivotal role in the semiconductor supply chain. In total, the study introduces the “Silicon Shield” concepts, which suggest that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry enhances its security through economic interdependence, thereby deterring potential aggression, especially from China. As nations increasingly invest in domestic semiconductor production, the sustainability of the “Silicon Shield” is called into question, prompting a deeper understanding of the dynamics at play.

To explore these dynamics, the author conducted extensive historical and contemporary analysis of Taiwan, the United States, and China, in the context of culture, escalation dynamics, and technological development’s relationship to economic development. This analysis informed the development of a new ruleset and play structure for an existing experimental wargame, SIGNAL, designed to examine military posturing and nuclear escalation. This new experimental wargame, “SIGNAL: Silicon Shield,” was designed as an expansion to the original SIGNAL game and investigates how changes in the global semiconductor supply chain influence strategic stability among nuclear-armed nations.

Key findings of this analysis conclude that China has a dominant cultural-historical relationship with Taiwan. This finding is based on premodern analysis of cultural norms and how China normalized international interaction dating back to the Warring States period. Additionally, the Chinese Civil War and contemporary interactions among China, Taiwan, and the United States amplify the mismatch of escalation tactics employed by both China and the United States across a wide range of scenarios marked by the shifting of interaction from mutually beneficial to zero-sum dynamics. This result is reinforced by preliminary analysis of the experimental wargame, which revealed that the presence of a consolidated semiconductor production site can significantly affect military posturing and nuclear escalation. This is due to the socioeconomic dependencies that raise the stakes of conflict, as nations may feel compelled to act militarily to secure or deny access to critical economic resources.

The preliminary analysis of the study infers that Silicon Shielding delays the probability of deterrence failure while simultaneously increasing the probability of deterrence failure in later rounds of gameplay. These findings are useful beyond the strictly scholarly application in the pragmatic understanding of how the United States can best uphold the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 and the Six Assurances to allow for differences to be resolved by peaceful means by maintaining credible deterrence. Clear communication and agreed upon rational calculations are central to deterrence. In this research, the author concludes that the United States and China should prioritize establishing initiatives that reduce the likelihood of later interactions from unexpectedly shifting to a highly competitive zero-sum dynamic to include enhancing lines of communication between the two nations, at all levels, formal and informal, this being wholly in line with the TRA sec.2 (b) (1) for an economically prosperous future in the U.S., China, and other Indo-Pacific states. This should emphasize the ideological meshing approach taken by the Congress of Vienna at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars. This research also concludes that the current juncture of Chinese politics may not be the appropriate time to establish such a system, noting that China’s policy framework operates in cycles and that the next Chinese policy-loosening cycle may be the nearest appropriate opportunity to coordinate a collaborative policy direction to drive down cultural misperceptions between both the United States and China.

Disciplines

International Law | International Relations | Political Science

Subject Area

International law; Information technology; International relations; Political science

Department

International Relations (INR)

First Advisor

Giannakos, Symeon A.

Second Advisor

Reinhardt, Jason C.

Third Advisor

Buckman, Kirk

Date of Award

2026

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Link to Full Text

Share

COinS